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Abstract 
A formal scheme is described for coalition formation in a game of interconnected 
participants with monotonic utility functions. Special coalitions are studied which have an 
advantage over the rest in the sense of higher utility for each of the participants taken 
separately. 
Comment regarding Rawls second principle of justice. 
It seems that coalition formation principle in current analysis is very much like as follows: 
“Rawls second principle of justice: The welfare of the worst-off individual is to be maximized 
before all others, and the only way inequalities can be justified is if they improve the welfare of 
this worst-off individual or group. By simple extension, given that the worst-off is in his best 
position, the welfare of the second worst-off will be maximized, and so on. The difference 
principle produces a lexicographical ordering of the welfare levels of individuals from the lowest 
to highest.” Cit. Public Choice III, Dennis C. Mueller (2003: 600) 
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(Tannun)
Onlrcrrnaerca  SoplraJrr,Eaff  cxeMa  o6pasonanlrfl  r(oaJluquit  n  tlrpe__B3al[-
MocBffBaunbrx  )rracrurrnoB  c  Monorouurrlrn  (pyuHrllrfiMtr  rloJreaHocrlr.  llsyua-
rorc.E oco6rre  RoaJrr{qrrrr, rrMeloql{e  [petrMyqecrBo  trepe[  BceMIt ocraJrblrbrMtr
B  cMbrcJre 6onrmeii  troJrearrocrrr  AJrfl Ka?fiAoro  rIB  ee  yqacrntrKoB  B  orAeJIb-
IIOCTtr,
l.  Baegenxe
B urpax  Muorr{x  Jrr4q  t1]  rroA  noarlrqneft  rroulrMaercfi  xoAMHo}necrBo
yqacrHnxon.  Cpe4r4  Bcex HoaJrlrqnft  o6HsTro  BbrAeJlflrorcfl  paql{onaJlEEbre  Hoa-
Jrr,rqrr[:  yqacrnun  raHofi KoaJrl4qtrrr  rraBJrenaer  zB BaalrMoAeftcrsrls B KoaJrI[-
qrdrr y4oBJreTBopflrorqyo ero troJrr,By.  Hpoue  roro,  'IrHorAa AorroJrurreJlbno
rpe6yercn,  uro6rr  trBBrerrerrlre  aroft 'troJlbabr  6rrro  o6ec,ueseno  HeBaBI(ctrMo  or
geficrnnfi :arponoB,  He BortreArrrr{x  B KoaJrlrqnro.  B pa6ote crpotrrcfl paailtrqubre
paSHoBr4AHOCTr4  ((SaMeqaTeJlbrrbrx))  ts cMbrcJre  paqI4oEaJrI''HocTrI  KoaJrr{q'trft  urpo-
noB r4  ynaabrBarorcfl  coorrrolrerrufl Melr(Ay  HIIMII.  Onlrcrrsarorcfl Tan)fie Horcr-
pyltrl{BHbre  rrpoqeAypbr  I4x  oTblcrtalrl4fl  .
flpe4nomenurrft  n pa6ore HJracc  ,urp ilogqarreu AotroJrHtrTeJIbHoMy  ycJroBlllo
r{onoro'Huocrr,r,  uayrreuuoMy paHee  n [2]  (xotn  Arfl tITeIrI{tr  Eacronrqeii crarbu
egasus  [2]  ue rpe6yercn).  Orruqran {opuamuoft  cxeMr,r  Hacroflrqefi  pa6otrr
or  [2]  no byqecrBy  Eer, a orilr4rrtre  B mnTeptrpeTaql{tr  co'crollr B roM, qto  a6-
cTpaRTr{bre  rroKaSaTeJrtr  B3arrMocBfl3l4  SJIeMeHTOB  CrrCTeMbr  troHIIMaroTcfl  SAeCb
fiar{ fionaaareJrrr  rroJregrocrfi.  Paeswrl.;'it  rroAxo4  B oAHoM  rlacrHor{ cryqae  troa-
BOJrmJr  ycTauoBr4Tb  BoSMolItEOCTb  AJrtr paqr{ouaJrF;Irbrx Hoaruquft  HaxoAtrTbcff
B co,croflHtrtr  rlnAtrBrrAyaJrbnoro  paBrroBecr{fl  rlo  Hamy.  flpnuep  ranoro  rl{tra
rrpr4BeAe'H  B KOHqe  cTarbtr.
2.  tDopr,tanbHbte  onpef,enen)la  ,'r  nonafl'ra
PacclrarprrBaercfl  Mrroxrecrr,o  n trrpoxoB,  o6oeHaqaeMoe  qepea  .I. Itamgoluy
rrrpony j=I  (j:1,,  2,,  .. . , n)  cotrocraBJleuo  MHo?fiecrro  .Ri,  rrg Koroporo trrpolt
i  uoxer  rrr6nparb  EJreMerrru.  flpe4troJraraeTc.fi,  qro  Mno?fiecJn1  .R1_HolreqHbr
r{ He rrepecenarorcfl.  I4x o6refllHerrl{e o6paayer  Mlroxtecrno  W:R'UA2U  . .  . Rn.
Oro6parinbre r{rpoxou i  aJreMeurr,r  'mz  Rl oocraBJrflror  Mlro)fiecrBo  Ai=Ri.  Muo-
Hmecrso  .4.j  uaarrsaercfl  srr6opolt I4rpona  f, a na6op <4t,,  A',...,  A")  -  coB-
r{ecrrrbrM  nrr6opou. Cnyuaft  Au:d  He ucxJlroqaercs r{ rraabrBaercfl orKaBoM
ft-ro urpona or nrr6opa.
Bne4eu  {yuHqran  troJreauocrrl  eJreMerHToB  u)eAi.  flpegrroro}r(I4M,  rrro ocy-
rrlecTBrrJrcfl  Hexoropuft ooBMecTrrrrit  nrr6op (A',  A',...,  A").  flycrs  tro pe-
3yJrr,Tary nrr6opa oAHoBHaqHo  otrpeAeJrflerctr  coBonyrrnocrT, rrllcer  n.20,
upr{urrcbrBaeMbrx  aJreMeHTavr  tueAi, i:L,2,...,  ni'r.a ocraJrsnbrx  SJIeMeETax
W  'tmcna He otrpeAeJrfloTcfl.  9ucna  rra,  HagblBarorcfl  tror(agareJlflMlr  troJregEo-
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1.  Introduction 
In many-persons games [1], by a coalition we shall understand a subset of participants. 
Among all coalitions we usually single out rational coalitions – a participant in such coalition 
extracts from the interaction in the coalition a benefit, which satisfies him. In addition, 
sometimes it is further stipulated that extraction of this benefit is ensured independently of 
the actions of the players not entering into the coalition. In this paper we construct different 
varieties of coalitions of players that are “outstanding” in the sense of rationality, and 
indicate relations between such coalitions. Also, constructive processes for discovering them 
are described. 
The class of games proposed in this paper is subjected to an additional monotonic 
condition, which has been studied earlier in [2] (although the knowledge of [2] here is not 
presupposed). There is no difference between the formal scheme of the present paper and 
that of [2] in essence; the difference involved in interpretation is in abstract indices of 
interconnection of elements of the system, which are understood as utility indices. The 
approach developed enables us to establish, in one particular case, the possibility of finding 
rational coalitions in the state of individual equilibrium according to Nash. An example of 
such a type is presented at the end of the paper. 
2.  Formal Definitions and Concepts 
We consider a set of n players denoted by I . Each player  I j∈   ) n ,..., , j ( 2 1 =  is matched 
by a set  j R  from which the player  j can select elements. It is assumed that the sets  j R  are 
finite and do not intersect. Their union forms a set  n R ... R R W ∪ ∪ ∪ = 2 1 . The elements 
selected by the player  j from  j R  compose a set  j
j R A ⊆ . The set 
j A  is called the choice 
of the player  j, while the collection 
n A ,..., A , A
2 1  is called the joint choice. The case 
∅ =
k A  is not excluded and is called the refusal of k -th player from the choice. 
We introduce the utility functions of elements 
j A w∈ . We assume that certain joint choice 
n A ,..., A , A
2 1  has been carried out. Let there be uniquely determined, with the respect to 
the result of the choice, a collection of numbers  0 w ≥ π  that are assigned to the elements 
n ,..., , j , A w
j 2 1 = ∈ ; on the remaining elements of W  the numbers are not determined. The 
numbers  w π  are called utility indices, or simply utilities, and by definition, are in general 
case functions  ) X ,..., X , X ( n w 2 1 π  of n variables. The value of the variable  j X  is the 
choice 
j A  of the player  j.  
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We shall single out utility functions possessing a special monotonic property. 
Definition 1. A set of utilities  w π  is called monotonic, if for any pair of joint choices 
n L ,..., L , L
2 1  and 
n G ,..., G , G
2 1  such that 
j j G L ⊆ ,  n ,..., , j 2 1 =  





2 1 2 1 π π ≤   (1) 
is fulfilled for any 
j L w∈
1. 
We now turn to the problem of coalition formation. We shall call any nonempty subset of 
the set of players a coalition. Let there be given a coalition V , and let its participants have 
made their choices. We compose from the choices 
j A  of the participants of the coalition V  
a set-theoretic union H , which is called the choice of the coalition V : 
j
V j A H ∈ = !
2. 
To determine the degree of suitability of the selection of an element  j R w∈  for the player 
j, a participant of the coalition, we introduce an index of guaranteed utility. With this aim 
we turn our attention to the dependence of the utility indices on the choice of the players not 
entering into coalition. It is not difficult to note that as a consequence of the monotonic 
condition of the functions  w π  the worst case for the participants of the coalition will be 
when all players outside the coalition V  reject the choice:  ∅ =
k A ,  V k∉ , so that all 
elements outside H  will not be chosen by any of the players who are capable of making 
their choices. In other words, the guaranteed (the least value) of utility  w π  of an element w 
chosen by a player in the case of fixed choices  j R H ∩  of his partners in the coalition 
equals  ) R H ,..., A ,..., R H ( n
j
w ∩ ∩ 1 π . 
The quantity 
  ) R H ,..., A ,..., R H ( ) H ( g n
j
w A w j j ∩ ∩ =
∈ 1 π min  
is called the guarantee of the participant  j in the coalition V  for the choice H . 
                                                           
1  We note that fulfilment of (1) is not required for the element 
j L w∉ . Furthermore, even the numbers  w π  
themselves may not be defined for 
j L w∉ . 
2 A  choice H  without indication about the coalition V , which has effected it, is not considered, and if 
somewhere the symbol V  is omitted, then under a coalition we understand a collection of players such and 
only such for which  ∅ ≠ ∩ j R H .  
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We assume that according to the rules of the game, for each chosen element 
j A w∈  a 
player  V j∈  must make a payment  ° u . It is obvious that under condition of the payment 
° u  the selection of each element 
j A w∈  is profitable or at least without loss to the player 
V j∈  if and only if  ° ≥ u w π . In the calculation for the worst case this thus reduces to the 
criterion  ° ≥ u ) H ( g j . In reality we shall be interested, in relation to the player  V j∈ , in all 
three possibilities: a)  ° > u ) H ( g j , b)  ° = u ) H ( g j  and c)  ° < u ) H ( g j . We shall say that 
a participant of the coalition V  is above  ° u , on the level of  ° u , and below  ° u , if the 
conditions a), b), and c) are fulfilled respectively. The size of the payment is further 
considered as a parameter u of the game being described and is called the threshold. We 
shall say that a coalition V , having made a choice H , functions on the level 
) H ( g ] H [ u j V j∈ = min . 
Definition 2. A coalition V  is called stable with the respect to a threshold  ] H [ u u = °  if 
for a certain choice  H  all participants of the coalition are not below  ° u  while someone in 
the coalition  V k ∪  is below  ° u  if any participant  V k∉  outside the coalition V  makes a 
nonempty choice  ∅ ≠
k A . 
The set of numerical values being attained by the function  ] H [ u  on stable coalitions will 
be called the spectrum. Each value of the function  ] H [ u  will be called the spectral level 
(or simply the level). The entire construction described above will be called a monotonic 
parametric game on W . 
Subsequently we will be interested in stable coalitions functioning on the highest possible 
spectral level. It is obvious that the spectrum of each monotonic game on a finite set W  is 
bounded, and therefore there exists a maximum spectral level  ] H [ u u W H⊆ = max
µ . 
Definition 3.  A stable coalition 
* V   such that for a certain choice 
* H   the level 
µ u : 
µ u ] H [ u =  is attained is called the kernel of the monotonic parametric game on W . 
Theorem 1. If 
* V1  and 
* V2  are kernels of the monotonic game on W , then one can always 
find the minimum kernel (in set-theoretic sense) 
*
c V  such that 
* * *
c V V V 2 1 ∪ ⊇ . The proof is 
presented in the appendix.  
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Theorem 1 asserts that the set of kernels in the sense indicated by the binary operation of 
coalitions is closed. The closeness of a system of kernels allows as looking at the largest (in 
the set-theoretic sense) kernel, i.e., a kernel K⊖ such that all other kernels are included in it. 
From the Theorem 1 it follows the existence of the largest kernel in any finite monotonic 
parametric game. 
The rest of the paper is devoted to the description of constructive methods of setting up 
coalitions that are stable with the respect to the threshold  ° u , including those stable with the 
respect to the threshold 
µ u , i.e., the kernels coalitions. In particular, a method of 
constructing the largest kernel is suggested. 
3.  Search of Stable Coalitions 
We consider a monotonic parametric game with n players. Below we bring together a 
system of concepts, which allows us constructively to discover stable coalitions with respect 
to an arbitrary threshold  ° u  if they exist. In the monotonic game only a limited portion of 
subsets of the set W  have to be searched in order to discover the largest stable coalition. 
With this aim in the following we study coalitions V  whose participants do not refuse from a 
choice: for  V j∈  the choice  ∅ ≠
j A . Such a coalition, which has effected a choice H , is 
denoted by  ] H [ V . From here on, for the motive of simplicity of notation of guaranteed 
utility  ) R H ,..., A ,..., R H ( n
j
w ∩ ∩ 1 π , where H  is a subset of the set W , we use 
) H ; w ( π . 
Definition 4.  A sequence  α   of elements  1 1 0 − m ,..., , α α α   (m  is the number 
of elements in W ) from W  is said to be in concord with respect to the threshold  ° u , if in a 
sequence of subsets of the set W  
  m m N , N ,..., N , N 1 1 0 − , 
where  W N = 0 ,  i i N N α \ i 1 = + ,  ∅ = m N , there exists a subset  p N  such that: 
a)  The utility  ° < u ) N ; ( i i α π  for all  p i < ; 
b)  For each  p N w∈  the condition  ) N ; w ( u p π ≤ °  is fulfilled, or, this being equivalent, 
for each  ) N ( V j p ∈  the condition  ) N ( g u p j ≤ °  
3 is fulfilled. 
                                                           
3 By  definition  ) N ; w ( ) N ( g p R N w p j j p π ∩ ∈ = min .  
 
 
   
5 
A sequence α , in concord with the respect to the threshold  ° u , uniquely defines the set 
p N . This fact is written in the form  p N ) ( N = α . 
Definition 5. A set  W S ⊆ °  is said to be in concord with the respect to a threshold  ° u , if 
there exists a sequence α  of elements of W , in concord with respect to the threshold  ° u  
and such that  ) ( N S α = ° , while the coalition  ) S ( V °  is said to be in concord with respect 
to the threshold  ° u . 
The following two statements are derived directly from Definitions 4 and 5. 
A.  In the case where the set  W S = °  is in concord with the respect to the threshold  ° u , all 
players  I j∈  are not below  ° u :  ° ≥ u ) W ( g j . 
B. If the set  ° S , in concord with the respect to the threshold  ° u , is empty, then there 
exists a chain of constructing sets 
  m m N , N ,..., N , N 1 1 0 − , 
such that for each player  I j∈ , commencing with a certain  t N , in all those coalitions 
) N ( V i ,  i t ≤ , where the player  j  enters, this player is below  ° u . 
Theorem 2. Let  ° S  be a set that is in concord with respect to the threshold  ° u . Then any 
stable coalition V  functioning on the level not less than  ° u  makes a choice  H , which is a 
subset of the set  ° S :  ° ⊆ S H . 
The proof is given in the appendix. 
Corollary 1. The set  ° S , in concord with respect to the threshold  ° u , is unique. Indeed, if 
we assume that there exists a set S′ , in concord with the respect to the threshold  ° u  and 
different from  ° S , then from theorem 2  ° ⊆ ′ S S . But analogously at the same time the 
inverse inclusion  ° ⊇ ′ S S  must also be satisfied, which bring us to conclusion that  ° = ′ S S . 
Corollary 2. As the spectral levels of functioning of coalitions in the monotonic parametric 
game grow, one can always find a chain of stable coalitions, included in one another and 
being in concord with respect to each increasing spectral level, as with respect to the 
growing threshold.  
 
 
   
6 
Indeed, from the formulation of the theorem it follows that a stable coalition, in concord with 
the respect to a spectral level  µ λ < , satisfies the relation  ) S ( V ) S ( V
µ λ ⊇ , since in a set-
theoretic sense 
µ λ S S ⊃ . 
Below we arrange a certain sequence α , which use up all elements of W . After the 
construction we formulate a theorem about the sequence α  thus constructed being in 
concord with respect to the threshold  ° u . The arrangement proves constructively the 
existence of a sequence of elements of W  that is necessary in the formulation of the 
theorem. 
Construction. Initial Step. 
Stage 1.  We consider a set of elements W . Among this set we search out elements  0 γ  
such that 
  ° < u ) W ; ( 0 γ π , (2) 
  and order them in any arbitrary manner in the form of a sequence  0 γ . If there are 
no such elements, then all elements of W  are ordered arbitrarily in the form of a 
sequence α , and the construction is completed. In this case W  is assumed to be 
the set  ) ( N α . 
Stage 2.  Subsequently we examine the sequence  0 γ . When considering the t -th element 
) t ( 0 γ  of this sequence  0 γ , the sequence α  is supplemented by the element 
) t ( 0 γ , which is denoted by the expression  ) t ( , 0 γ α α ← , while the set W  is 
replaces by  α \ W . After the last element of  0 γ  is examined we go over to the 
recursive step of the construction. 
Recursive Step k . 
Stage 1.    Before constructions of the k -th step there is already composed a certain 
sequence α  of elements from W . Among the set  α \ W  we seek out elements 
k γ  such that 
  ° < u ) W ; ( k α γ π \ , (3) 
  and order them in any arbitrary manner in the form of a sequence  k γ . 
Analogously to the initial step, if there happen to be no elements  k γ , the 
construction is ended. In this case in the role of the set  ) ( N α  we choose  α \ W  
while  α  is completed in an arbitrary manner with all remaining elements 
from W .  
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Stage 2.  Here we carry out constructions, which are analogous to stage 2 of the initial step. 
The entire sequence of elements  k γ  is examined element by element. While 
examining the t -th element  ) t ( k γ  the sequence α  is complemented in 
accordance with the expression  ) t ( , k γ α α ← . After examining the last 
element  ) t ( k γ  of the sequences  k γ  we return to stage 1 of the recursive step. 
On a certain step  p, either initial or recursive, at stage 1 there are no elements γ , which 
are required by the inequalities (2) or (3), and the construction could not continue any more. 
Theorem 3.  A sequence  α   constructed according to the rules of the procedure is in 
concord with the respect to the threshold  ° u . 
The proof is presented in the appendix. 
In the current section, in view of the use, as an example, of the concepts just introduced, 
we consider a particular case of a monotonic parametric game in which the difference in the 
individual and cooperative behavior of the participants of the coalition is easily revealed. We 
assume that the utilities 





1 1 1 + − π  
do not depend on  j X  in the case that choices specified by the remaining players are fixed. In 
this case the  j-s participant of the coalition V , under the condition that the remaining 
participants of it keep their choices, can limit his choice  j X  to a single element  j R w ∈ ′  on 
which the maximum guarantee  ) H ( g j R w j ∈′ max  is attained. However, such a selection 
narrowing his choice down to a single-element, generally speaking, reduces the choice (in 
view of monotonicity of utility indices  w π ) to the guarantee of the remaining participants of 
the coalition. Consequently, individual behavior of the participants of a coalition contradicts 
their cooperative behavior. In spite of this contradiction, in the general case, in the given 
case, using the concept of a stable coalition  ) S ( V °  in concord with respect to the threshold 
° u , and having slightly modified the criteria of “individual interests” of the players, we can 
convince someone that there always exists a situation in which the individual interests do not 
contradict the coalition interests.  
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We define the winnings of the  j-th participant of the coalition in the form of the sum of 
utilities after subtraction of all payments  ° u , i.e., as the number 
  = ) H ( f j [] ∑ ∈ ° −
j A w u ) H ; w ( π  
(the winnings  k f  for  V k∉  are not defined). Having represented H  as a joint choice 
V A ,..., A , A
  2 1 , we can consider the behavior of each  j-th participant as player in a 
certain non-cooperative game selecting a strategy 
j A . 
The situation of individual equilibrium in the sense of Nash [1] of the participants of the 
coalition V  in the game with winnings  j f  is defined as their joint choice 
* j
* V j H A = ∈ !  
such that for each  V j∈   






* * j ≤
+ − V 1 1 1  
for any  j
j R A ⊆ . In other word, the situation of equilibrium exists if none of the 
participants of the coalition has any sensible cause for altering his choice 
j
* A  under the 
condition that the rests keep to their choices. 
Not every choice H  of participants of the coalition V  is an equilibrium situation. To see 
this it is sufficient to consider a choice H  such that in the coalition V  there are players 
having chosen elements 
j A w∈  with utilities  ° < u ) H ; w ( π ; for the selection of such an 
element the player pays more than this element brings in winnings  ) H ( f j  and, therefore, 
for the player, proceeding merely on the basis of individual interests, it would be 
advantageous to refrain from selection of such elements. Refraining from the selection of 
such elements of the set H  is equivalent to non-equilibrium of H  in the sense of Nash. 
Lemma. Let the utilities  ) H ; w ( π  be independent of 
j A . Then a joint choice  ° S  of the 
participants of the stable coalition  ) S ( V ° , in concord with the respect to the threshold  ° u , 
is a situation of individual equilibrium.  
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Indeed, according to Theorem 2,  ° S  is the largest choice in the set-theoretic sense among 
all choices H  of the stable coalition  ) S ( V ° , where for any  H w∈  the relation 
° ≥ u ) H ; w ( π  is fulfilled. Let the choice of the participants of the coalition, with an 
exception of that of the  j-th participant, be fixed. Since the utilities  ) S ; w ( ° π  do not 
depend on 
j A , the  j-th participant of  ) S ( V °  cannot secure an increase in the winnings 
) S ( f j °  either by broadening or by narrowing his choice in comparison with  ° ∩ S R j . 
4.  Coalitions functioning on the highest spectral level 
We consider the problem of search of the largest kernel. First of all we present some facts, 
which are required for the solution of this problem. 
From the definition of the guarantee  ) H ( g j  of the participant  j  effecting the choice H  
we see that the equality 
  ) H ; w ( ) H ( g j A w j π
∈ = min  (4) 
is fulfilled. Hence, according to the definition of the level  ] H [ u  of functioning of the 
coalition  ) H ( V  it follows that 
  ) H ; w ( ] H [ u H w π ∈ = min  
If we carry out a search of the subset 
* H  of the set W  on which the value of the 
maximum of the function  ] H [ u  is achieved, then thereby the search of a coalition 
functioning on the highest level  ] H [ u u =
µ  of the spectrum of a monotonic parametric 
game is effected. Without describing the search procedure, we give the definition of a 
sequence of elements W  allowing us to discover the largest (in the set-theoretic sense) 
choice H⊖ of the largest coalition – a kernel K⊖.  
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Definition 6. A sequence α  of elements  1 1 0 − m ,..., , α α α  (m is the number of elements 
in W ) from W is called the defining sequence of the monotonic game, if in the sequence 
of sets 
4 
  m m N , N ,..., N , N 1 1 0 −  
there exists a subsequence  p ,..., , Γ Γ Γ 1 0  such that: 
a)  for any element  1 + ∈ k k i Γ Γ α \  of the sequence α  the utility  ] [ u ) N ; ( k i i 1 + < Γ α π  
) p ,..., , k ( 1 1 0 − = ; 
b)  in the stable coalition  ) ( V p Γ  no subcoalition exists on a level above  ] [ u p Γ . 
From the Definition 6 one can see that the defining sequence in many ways is analogous to 
a sequence, which is in concord with the respect to the level  ° u . Since any stable coalition 
) ( V k Γ  functions on the level  ] [ u u k
k Γ = , it is not difficult to note that the defining 
sequence α  composes strictly increasing spectral levels  ] [ u ... ] [ u ] [ u p Γ Γ Γ < < < 1 0  of 
functioning of stable coalitions  ) ( V k Γ  in the monotonic parametric game. As a result, we 
require yet another formulation. 
Definition 7. A stable coalition  I V ⊆  is said to be determinable, if there exists a defining 
sequence α  of elements W  such that among the choices of this coalition there is a choice 
p Γ  composed by α  according to Definition 6. 
Theorem 4. For each monotonic parametric game a determinable coalition exists and is 
unique. Among the choices of the determinable coalition there is a choice on which the 
highest spectral level 
µ u  is attained. 
The proof of the theorem is presented in the appendix. 
Corollary to Theorem 4. The concepts of a determinable coalition and the largest kernel 
are equivalent. 
                                                           
4  The given sequence is constructed exactly in the same way as the one in Definition 4.  
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Indeed, directly from the formulation of the Theorem 4 we see that a determinable 
coalition always is the largest kernel. Hence, since a determinable coalition always exists, 
while the largest kernel is unique, it follows that the largest kernel coincides with the 
determinable coalition. 
Thus, the problem of search of the largest kernel is solved if we construct a defining 
sequence α  of elements W . The construction of α  can be effected by the procedure of 
discovering kernels (KFP) from [2]. In conclusion we present yet another approach to the 
concept of “stability” of a coalition. 
5 
Definition 8. A coalition V ˆ  is said to be a critical, if for a certain choice  H ˆ  of it no 
coalition V  having a nonempty intersection with the coalition V ˆ  functions on a level higher 
than  ] H ˆ [ u . The level  ] H ˆ [ u u ˆ =  is called the critical level of the coalition V ˆ , while the 
choice H ˆ  is called its critical choice. 
From the Definition 8, in particular, it follows at once the uniqueness of the critical level of 
the coalition V ˆ . Indeed, on the contrary, if were two different levels u ˆ′  and u ˆ ′′ ,  u ˆ u ˆ ′′ < ′ , 
then u ˆ′  could not be a critical one according to the definition: it is sufficient to consider the 
coalition  V ˆ V =  itself with the choice H ˆ ′′ , which ensures  u ˆ u ˆ ′ > ′′ . 
It is obvious that kernels are critical coalitions. The inverse statement, generally speaking, 
is not true; a critical coalition is not necessarily a kernel. 
We now consider the following hypothetical situation. Let V ˆ  be a critical coalition and let 
H ˆ  be its critical choice. We assume that this coalition is stable with respect to the threshold 
° u ; i.e.,  ] H ˆ [ u u ≤ °  (see Definition 2). We assume that an increase of the threshold  ° u  up 
to the level  ] H ˆ [ u u > °  took place and the critical coalition V ˆ  with the critical choice H ˆ  
was transformed into unstable coalition with respect to the higher threshold  ° u . Let the 
participants of the coalition V ˆ  preserving the stability of the coalition attempt to increase 
their guarantees. One of the possibilities for increasing the guarantee of a participant  V ˆ j ∈ 0  
is to refrain from the choice of an element  0
0
j A ∈ α  on which the value  ) H ( g j0  - the 
                                                           
5  This approach is close to the concept of “M-stability” in cooperative n-person games [1].  
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minimum level of utility guaranteed for him, see (4), is attained. It is natural to assume that a 
participant with a level of guarantee  ° < = u ] H ˆ [ u ) H ˆ ( g j0  will be among the participants 
attempting to increase their guarantees, and refrains from the selection of the element  0 α  
indicated above. It may happen that the refusal of  0 α  gives rise, for another participant 
) H ˆ ( V j 0 1 α \ ∈ , to a decrease from his guarantee  ] H ˆ [ u ) H ˆ ( g j >
1  to the quantity 
] H ˆ [ u ) H ˆ ( g j ≤ 0 1 α \ . A participant  ) H ˆ ( V j 0 1 α \ ∈ , acting from the same considerations 
as  0 j , refrains from the selection of an element  1 α  on which  ) H ˆ ( g j 0 1 α \  is attained. Such 
a refusal of  1 α  can give rise to subsequent refusals, and emerges hereby a chain of 
“refusing” participants  〉 〈 ,... j , j 1 0  of the coalition V ˆ . 
If a coalition V , stable with respect to the threshold  ° u  in the sense of Definition 2, with 
the choice H  became unstable as the threshold  ° u  increases, then such a coalition, generally 
speaking, disintegrates; i.e., some of its participants may become participants of a new 
coalition which already is stable with the respect to the increased threshold  ° u . By definition 
of a critical coalition, transaction of its participants into new stable coalition, when the 
threshold  ° u  increases is not possible, and it disintegrates completely. The theorem 
presented below and proved in the appendix reflects a possible character of complete 
disintegration of a critical coalition in terms of the hypothetical system described above. 
Theorem 5. Let there be given a critical coalition V ˆ  having a nonempty intersection with 
a certain coalition V :  ∅ ≠ ∩ V V ˆ . Let  H  be the choice of the coalition V  and  H ˆ  the 
critical choice of the coalition V ˆ . Then in the coalition  V V ˆ ∩  there exists a sequence of its 
participants  1 1 0 − = r j ,..., j , j j  such that: a) in the sequence  j there are represented all 
participants of the coalition  V V ˆ ∩   (the players  i j   may be repeated,  r  is number of 
elements in  H H ˆ ∪ ; b) for the sequence  j  we can construct a chain of contracting 
coalitions 
  ) N ( V ),..., N ( V ), N ( V r 1 1 0 − , 
where  H H ˆ N ∪ = 0 ,  i i N N ⊂ + 1 , so that for any  V j∈ , commencing from a certain  t N , in 
all those coalitions  ) N ( V i ,  i t ≤ , into which the player  j enters, this player is not above 
] H ˆ [ u .  
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5.  Example of a Monotonic Game 
6 
We consider a game of n customers who at the same time are suppliers of certain goods. 
Let each  j-th customer supply goods of  j-th designation,  n ,..., , j 2 1 = . The situation under 
consideration is conveniently depicted in the form of a set of arcs W  of a graph G of 
potential deliveries of goods, and the customer–supplier, in the form of a set of its nodes. A 
potentially effectible delivery of goods for sum of c  bank notes is depicted on the graph by a 
c -fold arc. 
We shall assume that a “player” in the sense of the scheme of the monotonic game 
described above is each participant when he acts in the role of a customer and decides from 
whom he orders the goods required by him. We define the choice of the  j-th customer in the 
form of a subset of arcs 
j A  of the set of potential arcs  j R , entering into the node  j  in the 
graph G;  j
j R A ⊆ . The nodes of the graph from which 
j A w∈  emerge are understood as 
the supplies of the goods, while a single arc w is interpreted as a supply, to the customer, of 
goods for the amount of one bank note. After all orders have been received, each  j-th 
customer–supplier carries out the supplies. 
We call any subset V  of the sets of nodes I  of the graph G a coalition, while the choice 
of a coalition is defined in the form of a set of arcs H  depicting supplies of goods in bank 
notes  H , is the money equivalent to the goods ordered by a coalition. 
We assume that the participants of the coalition stimulate mutual business contacts. A 
supplier of goods, being a participant of a coalition, can, e.g., propose a certain rebate to his 
customer. Here the magnitude of rebate is appropriately set in accordance with the business 
activity of the supplier, having taken as a measure of its business activity the number of 
suppliers to himself. Taking into account what has been said, we determine the rebate in 
bank notes of goods supplied to the customer, in the form 
w
w b ⋅ θ , where 
w b  is the number 
of supplies with whom the supplier concluded deals, having dispatched goods along the arc 
j A w∈ ,  w θ  is a coefficient of proportionality. 
                                                           
6 See  also  http://www.datalaundering.com/download/nonjoke.pdf .  
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Let  w h  be the money equivalent of the useful effect for the  j-th participant of the 
coalition in the account in bank notes of goods being consumed, ordered along the arc 




w w w b h ⋅ + = θ π . 
We determine utility of an order along the arc 
j A w∈  as a quantity of money equivalent 
to the overall  w π  per bank note of the goods ordered. The guarantee of the  j-th participant 
of the coalition, just as in the general scheme, is quantity 
  w A w j j ) H ( g π
∈ = min . 
We determine the aim of the coalition as creation of a certain fund by means of deductions 
from utilities  w π . A rational coalition V  is one which from the utility  w π  per bank notes of 
goods ordered can deduct into the fund a certain sum of money  0 > ° u , i.e., if and only if 
° ≥ u w π  for all  H w∈ . We shall show that the concept of a rational coalition is equivalent 
to the concept of a stable coalition with respect to a threshold  ° u , if as value of the 
parameter of the game of customers–suppliers we take the amount deducted into the fund 
being created. Indeed, if  ° ≥ u w π  for any 
j A w∈ , then  V j∈ ,  ° ≥ u g j , i.e., the coalition 
V  is stable with the respect to the threshold  ° u  (see Section 2) and visa versa. 
From the results of Section 3 it follows that in the game of customers–suppliers there exists 
a chain of enclosed rational coalitions, which contract with the growth of the amount of 
deductions  ° u . The procedure of search of rational coalitions allows us to uncover the 
structure of the chain, e.g., to answer the question: is the original set of customers-suppliers a 
rational coalition? On the basis of Theorem 4 we can find the largest kernel – a critical 
coalition sustaining the maximum amount of deductions 
µ u , which constitutes the main 
interest in this model. 
Concluding, we turn our attention to the form of contradiction between the individual and 
co-operative behavior of the participants of a coalition in the monotone game, using the 
example of the game of customers-suppliers of goods. From the example it is seen that 
purely individual behavior with the respect to the index of guarantee would lead to situation 
in which each customer has a single supplier. It is obvious that a rational coalition originates 
in general case a more “branched” network of contacts between participants of the coalition 
so that the level of the index of guarantee by each of the participants will be much higher.  
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let the level 
µ u  be attained for the coalitions 
* V1  and 
* V2 , which 
effect the choices 
* H1  and 
* H2 respectively; i.e.,  ] H [ u u
*
1 =
µ  and  ] H [ u u
*
2 =
µ . For 
player  I j∈  we consider two choices:  j
* j R H H ∩ = 1 1  and  j
* j R H H ∩ = 2 2
7. By the 
definition of guarantee  ) H ( g
*
j 1  for the participant 
* V j 1 ∈  of the coalition we have 
 











min ; (A.1) 
for the participant 
* V j 2 ∈  we respectively have 
 











min . (A.2) 
We determine the choice of a participant 
* * V V j 2 1 ∪ ∈  as 
j j j H H 2 1 ∪ = Φ . The monotonic 
property (1) allows us to conclude that the following inequalities are valid: 











min min π Φ Φ Φ π
∈ ∈ ≥ ; (A.3) 











min min π Φ Φ Φ π
∈ ∈ ≥ . (A.4) 
Combining (A.1) – (A.4), we obtain 
 
µ
Φ Φ Φ Φ π u ) ,..., , (
n
w w j ≥
∈
2 1 min  (A.5) 
for any 
* * V V j 2 1 ∪ ∈ . If by 
* Φ  we denote the set 
* * H H 2 1 ∪ , then for the coalition 
* * V V 2 1 ∪  
effecting the choice 
* Φ  the inequality (A.5) is rewritten in the form 
 
µ Φ u ) ( g
*
j ≥ , 
* * V V j 2 1 ∪ ∈ . (A.6) 
Due to the monotonic property (1) some elements 
* w Φ ∉  (if one can find such) may be 
added to 
* Φ  while the inequality (A.6) is still true 
8. We will denote the enlarged set by 
c Φ : 
* c Φ Φ ⊇  and obviously for  ) ( V V
c c Φ =  we have 
* * c V V ) ( V 2 1 ∪ ⊇ Φ . By the definition 
of a spectral level 
µ u , for the participant 
c V j ∈ ′ , on which  ] [ u
c Φ  is attained, we have 
 
µ Φ Φ u ] [ u ) ( g
c c
j ≤ = ′ , (A.7) 
since 
µ u  is the maximum spectral level of functioning of coalitions in the monotonic game. 
Applying (A.7) and (A.6) to the choice 
c Φ  for the participant  j j ′ = , we see that 
µ Φ u ) ( g
c
j = ′ , and the coalition 
* * c V V V 2 1 ∪ ⊇  functions on the spectral level 
µ u . The 
theorem is proved. ! 
                                                           
7  We note that, in the worst case, for player 
* V k 1 ∉  (
* V k 2 ∉ ),  ∅ =
k H1  ( ∅ =
k H2 ). 
8  We suppose that such elements cannot be added to 
c Φ .  
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Proof of Theorem 2. Let  ° S  is a subset of the set W  in concord with the respect to the 
threshold  ° u ; i.e., there exists a sequence α , in concord with the respect to the threshold 
° u , such that  ) ( N S α = ° . We assume that there exists a coalition V  effecting a choice 
° ⊂ S H  and functioning on the level  ° ≥ u ] H [ u ;  ∅ ≠ ° S H \ . Let  ° ∈ S H \ 1 α  and let 
t α  be an element, which is leftmost in the sequence α . Let  p be the index of the set  p N  in 
the sequence  m m N , N ,..., N , N 1 1 0 − . It is obvious that  p t <  and, consequently, 
  ° < u ) N ; ( t t α π  (A.8) 
in accordance with a) of the Definition 4. Since the game being considered is monotonic, 
H t ∈ α  and  t N H ⊆  there must hold 
  ) N ; ( ) H ; ( t t t α π α π ≤ . (A.9) 
From inequalities (A.8) and (A.9) it follows 
  ] H [ u u ) N ; ( t t ≤ ° < α π  (A.10) 
(the latter ≤  by assumption). According to the inequality (A.10) and by the definition of 
] H [ u  we have 
  ) H ( g ) H ; ( j V j t ∈ < min α π . (A.11) 
Let the element  t α  be chosen by a certain q-th player; i.e., 
q
t A ∈ α ,  V q∈ . On the basis of 
(A.11) we assume that 
  ) H ( g ) H ; ( q t < α π  (A.12) 
is valid. By definition  ) H ; w ( ) H ( g q A w q π
∈ = min . Following (A.12), we note that 
) H ; w ( min ) H ; ( q A w t π α π
∈ < . The last inequality is contradictory, what proves the 
theorem. !  
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Proof of Theorem 3. We assume that the construction of the sequence α  according to the 
rules of the procedure ended on a certain  p-th step. This means that α  is made up of 
sequences  k γ   ) p ,..., , k ( 1 0 = , and also of elements of the set  p N , found according to the 
rules of the procedure and being certainties for the sequences  k γ . We consider any element 
i α  of the sequence thus constructed, being located on the left of the α -th element:  p i < . 
The given element in the construction process falls into certain set  q γ . By construction 
  ° < ∪ ∪ ∪ − u } ... { W ; ( q i 1 1 0 γ γ γ α π \ . (A.13) 
If to the sequence  〉 〈 − 1 1 0 q ,..., , γ γ γ  we add the elements  q γ , which in α  are on the left of the 
i α -th, then this set of elements together with the added part  q γ  composes the complement 
i N  up to the set W  (see Definition 4). On the basis of the monotonic property (1) we 
conclude that  ) N ; ( ) N W ; ( } ... { W ; ( i i i i q i α π α π γ γ γ α π = ≥ ∪ ∪ ∪ − \ \ 1 1 0 . The last 
relation in the combination with (A.13) shows that  ° < u ) N ( i i α π . From the construction of 
the sequence α  it is also obvious that for any  ) N ( V j p ∈  the guarantee  ° ≥ u ) N ( g p j . 
The theorem is proved. ! 
Proof of the Theorem 4. Theorem can be proved as follows. First, a sequence α , in 
concord with respect to the highest spectral level 
µ u , in the monotonic game exists, 
according to Theorem 3, and is, at the same time, a defining sequence; as the subsequence 
p ,..., , Γ Γ Γ 1 0  in this case we have to choose the sequence 
µ S , W , where 
µ S  is a set 
W S ⊂
µ  which is in concord with respect to the highest level 
µ u . The determinable 
coalition is  ) S ( V
µ . The uniqueness of the coalition  ) S ( V
µ  is proved in Corollary 1 to the 
Theorem 1. Secondly, the choice 
µ S  of the coalition  ) S ( V
µ , playing the part of the set  p Γ  
in the Definition 6, attains the maximum of the function  ] H [ u , a fact which follows from 
Theorem 3 and b) of Definition 6; i.e., 
µ µ u ] S [ u = . Thirdly, the last statement of Theorem 
4 is a particular case of the statement of Theorem 2, if we put 
µ u u = ° . The theorem 
is proved. !  
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Proof of the Theorem 5. We consider a monotonic game of participants of a coalition 
V V ˆ ∪  on the set  H H ˆ ∪ , where H ˆ  is the critical choice of the critical coalition V ˆ , and 
H  is some choice of the coalition V . Below the set  H H ˆ ∪  is denoted by Ω , while all 
concepts refer to a monotonic sub-game on Ω . 
Let  ° u  be the threshold of the parameter u of the game on Ω , and let  ] H [ u u > ° . We 
construct a sequence α  of elements Ω , which is in concord with respect to the threshold 
° u . Two variants could be represented: 1) the set  ° S , in concord with the respect to the 
threshold  ° u  is empty; 2)  ° S  is not empty. We consider them one after the other. First, in 
the variant 1) from a sequence of elements α  of elements of Ω  in concord with respect to 
the threshold  ° u , we uniquely determine a sequence of participants of the coalition  V V ˆ ∪  
choosing elements  i α  from sequence α  and composing a certain chain  1 1 0 − = r j ,..., j , j j  
(r is the number of elements Ω ). Secondly, from the sequence α  we also uniquely 
determine the sequence of coalitions  ) N ( V ),..., N ( V , N ( V r 1 1 0 − , where  Ω = 0 N , 
i i i N N α \ = + 1 , with  ) N ( V j i i ∈ . 
In the second variant none of the participants of the coalition V  can be in a coalition, 
which is in concord with the respect to the threshold  ] H [ u u > ° . This would contradict the 
definition of a critical coalition V . Therefore in the chain  j thus constructed of participants 
of the coalition  V V ˆ ∪  (by the same method as in the first variant) all participants of the 
coalition V  are on the left of the  p j -th player;  p  is uniquely determined from the sequence 
α  (see Definition 4). By property a) of the Definition 4 and from the definition of the 
guarantee of a player  ) N ( V j i i ∈  we have 
  ° < ≤ u ) N ; ( ) N ( g i i i ji α π . (A.14) 
Proceeding from the structure of the spectrum of a monotonic parametric game on Ω  (see 
Corollary 2 to the Theorem 2) the value  ° u  marginally close to  ] H [ u  is satisfied 
successfully in the two variants considered. The first variant of the Theorem 5 forms the 
statement b) derived earlier from Definition 4 and 5 (see section 2). The second variant of 
the statement of the theorem is directly derived from the relation (A.14). ! 
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